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Black conservatism in the 1980s: will the
future be conservative … for African
Americans?
Lisa Veroni-Paccher
1 With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the obstacles to registration and voting
were removed, and black political participation greatly increased. Meanwhile, thanks to
the Civil Rights Movement, which reinforced group identity and cohesion, the election of
African Americans to Congress accelerated and marked the decline of protest strategies.
Direct  social  mobilization and political  action were now favored.  These new political
leaders were all Democrats and quickly formed the most liberal group of the legislative
branch. They were supported by black voters who had become loyal to the Democratic
Party in the 1930s and shared the liberal views of their representatives. Despite demands
for  descriptive  representation,  African  Americans  were  also  asking  for  substantive
representation.  Indeed,  both  forms  of  representation  came  together  for  those  who
believed  that  Black  political  leaders  were  the  only  persons  capable  of  ‘authentic’
representation. A history of past oppression and the need for electoral representation led
to the conclusion that they would promote specific black interests. African Americans
have been strongly bound by a sense of group identity, even though their political views
have changed greatly since the 1970s (Jaynes & Williams 1989). Thus, even if the broad
notion of “group’s interest” is usually difficult to define, it may be that, because of their
sense of “common fate”, a specific set of “black interests” is easier to construe (Haynie
2001).  This does not mean, of course,  that African Americans are monolithic in their
political thinking. Their geographic, social and economic heterogeneity alone indicates
that they cannot be considered politically homogeneous, even if their identification to
liberal  ideas remains strong (Nie,  Verba & Petrocik 1999).  The National  Black Elections
Studies of 1984, 1988 and 1996, a substantial national survey of black voters, confirms that
their positioning is liberal to extremely liberal, especially on racial matters (Tate 1994,
29-38).  The  black  ideological  liberalism  that  is  present  at  the  mass  level  is  also
characteristic of the institutionalised Black leadership. Furthermore, black interests are
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understood in collective terms. Insofar as the fight for civil rights in the 50s & 60s was
successful because of the political unity of the actors of the movement, African Americans
continue to share a liberal vision. In 1967, however, Black nationalists, some decidedly
radical, others more moderate, started claiming that traditional political strategies, such
as the ones used by the Civil Rights Movement at the time, were not the answer to the
plight of African Americans. Stokely Carmichael, who was then president of the Student
Nonviolent Coordination Committee, defined, with Charles Hamilton, a new ideological cadre
through the notion of Black Power, which was based on the fundamental premise that
"before a group can enter the open society, it must first close its ranks". Its aim was to
articulate and defend collective interests as well as fight against systemic racism. In 1972,
in Gary, Indiana, the first black national convention was organized with Black nationalists
and liberal integrationists who were willing to create a political consensus for the defense
of collective interests. Because the liberal integrationist strategies adopted by the new
Black elected officials were heavily criticized, the Gary convention failed to bring political
unity and the failure of the following conventions, in 1974, 1978 and 1980, seemed to
show two things:
• first, that the Black political elite had failed to become united across ideological and political
lines; ‘unity without uniformity’ couldn’t become a reality
• second, that liberal integrationism (a form of liberalism which articulates and provides
solutions for the defence of specific black interests) was the most prominent ideology
among the members of the newly institutionalised political elite, mainly composed of civil
rights veterans and black elected officials. 
2 A few weeks after the last black national convention, held in Philadelphia in November
1980, Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, two black economists, organized, with the help
of intellectuals, politicians and businessmen, a Conference in Fairmont, California. Held
between the 12th and the 13 th of  December,  it  aimed at  creating alternative political
strategies for the benefit of African Americans. Most of the 125 participants shared the
same political vision. 
3 The ambition of Black conservatives was quite clear: by their emphasis on the need for
personal responsibility, transethnicity, and political diversity in the community, they tried
to  modify  the  political  discourse  on  matters  that  are  of  most  concern  to  African
Americans,  such  as  high  poverty  rates,  equal  rights  and  racial  discrimination.  The
resurgence  of  a  black  conservative  ideology  was  the  expression  of  a  rejection  of  a
collective  vision  of  African  Americans  interests.  This  tension  between  the  desire  to
integrate fully into the wider American society and the need to promote a set of interests
that is attached to a particular group is so palpable in the Black conservative discourse
that it renders it utterly paradoxical.
4 Black conservatives also hoped they would replace the existing Black leadership in the
near future. The Fairmont Conference also helped them strengthen ties with members of
the Reagan team such as Edwin Meese, a counselor with Cabinet Rank at the White House.
Clarence Pendleton, Henry Lucas, and Clarence Thomas, all became active members in the
new Republican government. 
5 To what extent can the Fairmont Conference be considered as the beginning of a genuine
black conservative movement?
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A new political vision
6 The year 1980 marked the end of the Black national conventions. The last one that none
of the influent Black elected officials nor members of the NAACP or the Urban League
attended, was held between the 21st and the 23rd of November 1980 in Philadelphia. In a
last  organizing  effort,  it  officially  created  a  National  Black  Independent  Political  Party
(NBIPP),  but  gathered  little  mass  support  and  remained  virtual.  This  led  to  the
abandonment  of  nationalist  strategies  by  most  Black  leaders  because  of  their  anti-
institutional  strain.  The  existence  of  diverging  viewpoints  on  social,  political  and
economic  matters  within  the  Black  political  elite  became  evident  at  the  Fairmont
Conference, which took place five weeks only after Reagan’s election.
7 The Fairmont Conference showed that the Black conservatives were trying to impose a
new vision based on individual responsibility, the notion of diversity within the ethnic
community and the absence of ethnic frontiers in the perception of the self, which they
called transethnicity. The actors of this new political scene were Clarence Thomas, then
aide  to  Republican  Senator  John  Danforth  (R-MO)  at  the  time;  Thomas  Sowell,  an
economist  member  of  the  Hoover  Institution;  Walter  Williams,  another  economist
following the steps  of  Sowell;  Clarence Pendleton,  president  of  the San Diego Urban
League and Tony Brown, radio show host (Brown stands apart as he considers himself
more a moderate nationalist than a Black conservative) (Rueter 1995, 97). Not of all the
participants considered themselves Black conservatives: some were liberal integrationists
or  nationalists;  others  were  White  conservatives,  such  as  Edwin  Meese  and  Milton
Friedman.  All  of  them nonetheless  expressed  the  need to  find  new solutions  to  the
problems that Blacks were facing at the beginning of the 1980s.
 
Individual responsibility
8 Most participants agreed that state interventionism at the social and economic level had
negative  effects.  According  to  them,  the  danger  was,  paradoxically,  that  it  helped
maintain socially and economically excluded African Americans and that welfare policies
promoted inactivity. For Black conservatives such as Michael Boskin and Walter Williams,
just like for other American conservatives, African Americans wanted what they called
economicfreedom,  and the governmental programs for housing and employment of the
1960s and 70s had been antagonistic to their interests. As an example, they mentioned
California’s Proposition 13, passed in 1978, when two-third of Californian voters agreed to
reduce  local  property  tax  revenues  and thus  changed  the  way  public  services  were
administered. Reagan’s electoral success and popularity provided evidence that America
was rejecting collective responsibility (The Fairmont Papers 1981,  9-12;  26-32;  51-53).
State programs aimed at improving the status of the poorest Americans weren’t working
and Black conservatives offered a simple explanation: racial discrimination did not play
as important a role in the lives of African Americans as before. If this was taken into
account in future social programs, people would realize that those based on race were
inadequate.  Walter  Williams stated that  African Americans  did not  need preferential
treatment:  they  needed  "government  off  their  backs".   One  must  remember  that
Americans were poor in the 40s, and African Americans were even poorer:
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Except for a small minority enjoying upper or middle class status, the masses of
American Negroes, in the rural South in the segregated slum quarters in Southern
and Northern cities, are destitute. They own little property: even their household
goods are mostly inadequate and dilapidated. Their incomes are not only low but
irregular. They thus live from day to day and have scant security for the future
(Myrdal 1944, 205).
9 However,  Myrdal  viewed  with  great  enthusiasm  the  new  industrialisation  and
urbanisation of African Americans. Indeed, between the 1940s and the 1960s, as they were
moving to the cities, they started getting access to the “comforts of American consumer
technology”  as  well  as  medical  care  thanks  to  the  programs  established  by  Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society (Jayne & Williams 1989, 272). However, in the early 1970s, despite
all the social and economic improvements brought about by the fight for civil rights, even
larger  differences  between  Blacks  and  Whites  started  appearing:  earnings  inequality
increased and polarization of the family income distribution occurred1. 
10 The profound rejection of racism as the main explanation for inequalities could also be
felt in the way Black conservatives dealt with questions of education. Sowell, Thomas, and
Brown put  the emphasis  on the potential  of  success  of  the individual  by taking two
historically black schools, Dunbar and Saint Augustine, as examples. Sowell tried to prove
that it was impossible to offer a large-scale explanation for scholarly success in terms of
differing socioeconomic status or separate facilities for boys and girls (FP 1981, 74-75). To
him, it  was more a question of individual effort.  As a consequence of this reasoning,
because they think parents become free to choose the education of their children, most
Black conservatives tend to promote school vouchers. Since, to them, the key-factor of
social  success resides in the freedom of choice of each individual,  they consider that
looking for collective solutions to the deficiencies of the school system is unproductive
(Ibid,  79).  Embracing the mainstream conservative discourse of  the era,  they explicit
reject the idea that state interventionism and compensatory education programs will
help improve the educational quality and environment of African American children.
 
Political diversity
11 For Thomas Sowell, the only way to justify black conservatives’ dismissal of the solutions
offered by the State in the 60s and 70s was to offer an empirical analysis of their impact,
such as the one he offered in his widely acclaimed book in conservative circles, Race &
Economics,  published  in  1975.  Sowell  considers  that  the  strong  link  between  the
representatives  of  the  black community  and its  members  has  been broken.  Whereas
liberal black leaders claim they can only defend black interests, there are other voices
that  are  just  waiting  to  be  heard.  He  believes  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Fairmont
Conference  participants,  that  he  identifies  as  "individuals  who  dare  to  think  for
themselves", to bring an alternative to the so-called liberal orthodoxy (FP 1981, 4).
12 In his inaugural speech, Sowell insists upon the fact that the conference participants, as
well  as African Americans in general,  are not ideologically united.  He underlines the
contrast  which  exists,  according  to  him,  between  the  uniform  vision  of  the
institutionalised black leadership and the possibilities explored in Fairmont. The notions
of diversity and alternative are thus recurring in his discourse.
13 For other participants, such as Thomas Berkley and Chuck Stone, two African American
journalists, the need for diversity transcends party lines. Stone believes that his ethnic
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community is afflicted with a one-party syndrome. It is thus urgent to form and promote
new leaders and new alliances. The only way to achieve this goal is to let Black politicians
deal  with  questions  that  are  not  specifically  linked  with  Black  interests  in  the  new
administration and the future ones (FP 1981, 118-119). 
14 It  quickly  becomes  difficult  to  understand  how  this  goal  can  be  achieved  by  Black
conservatives when they start  criticizing in very harsh terms the new Black leaders,
affiliated  with  the  Democratic  Party.  Black  conservatives  obviously  feel  closer  to
Republicans and do not consider the Black political  elite legitimate.  They know that,
contrary to a majority of African Americans, the new Black leadership of the 1980s rejects
the school voucher system and is against the implementation of stricter laws against
crime. Moreover, most Black Elected Officials at the time favoured busing and affirmative
action in employment and education, whereas African Americans as a whole were more
divided on the issues.
15 As for  Sowell,  although he wishes  to  stress  the merits  of  political  diversity,  he only
focuses on the opposition between existing liberal programs, deemed counterproductive,
and  future  conservative  policies,  that  he  assimilates  to  economic  success  and
improvement  of  the  living  conditions  of  African  Americans  and  other  Americans.
According to him, the only alternative is the conservative one. Most participants share
his  viewpoint,  and hope that  the conference will  offer  them more visibility  and the
opportunity to benefit from the support of white conservatives, and thus, from the new
Reagan administration. The idea here is not only to offer a new vision on Black interests,
but also to create an alternative at the elite level. In order to gain the support of other
conservatives  and  of  the  Republican  Party,  through  the  integration  in  the  new
Republican-led government, Black conservatives also expressed the need to show that
they were able to organize coalitions of interests transcending ethnic identity.
Transethnicity
16 For Henry Lucas, member of the Republican National Committee and former member of the
Institute  of  Contemporary  Studies,  which  was  sponsoring  the  conference,  the  need  for
political  diversity  was  first  and  foremost  a  need  for  ethnic  transcendence.  In  his
presentation, he underlined the necessity to find common interests and form coalitions
not articulated in racial  terms (FP 1981,  91-92).  Despite the absence of  references to
conservatism, it seems that these common interests are conservative ones indeed. Most
participants wished to rally the larger conservative movement, to which Edwin Meese
and Milton  Friedman belonged.  But  there  was  a  paradox:  if  the  organisation  of  the
conference had required the collaboration of members of the new Reagan administration,
which apparently shows the will to build interethnic coalitions, most of the 125 Fairmont
participants  were African Americans and their  papers focused only on specific  Black
interests.
 
Fairmont, Reagan & the republican party
17 The  support  of  the  Reagan  administration  given  to  the  new  Black  conservatives
symbolized a break between the government and the established Black leadership. At the
Fairmont Hotel, hopes were high that the political future would be conservative, thus
there were no expectations concerning the meetings organised between Reagan and the
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Congressional  Black  Caucus,  or  civil  rights  leaders,  who  were  said  to  defend  obsolete
strategies.  Edwin  Meese,  addressing  Black  conservatives,  referred  to  one  of  these
meetings in the following terms: "They were talking about the last ten years and the ideas
of the last ten years. You are talking about the ideas of the next ten years and beyond"
(FP 1981, 160).
18 Even if ideological diversity was a reality at the Fairmont Conference, everyone, except
maybe Charles Hamilton, Percy Sutton and Martin Kilson, felt closer to Republicans Party
than to Democrats and relied upon the new Reagan administration to show them that
they were right to believe that there would be in the near future, new white candidates in
the Republican ranks ready to defend black interests2. The Republicans needed to show
that they were going to offer new opportunities to potential black candidates. For some,
such as Percy Sutton, there were still doubts that the Party could do such a thing (FP
1981,  156).  For  others,  such  as  Gloria  Toote,  formerly  working  in  the  Nixon
administration, it was obvious that African Americans would find, in the Party, ways to
consolidate their political influence. It was high time for the Republican Party to expand
its electoral base. Its new voters could be Black voters, who would then become able to
articulate their interests within the two-party system (FP 1981, 142). 
19 What Black conservatives wanted was to distance themselves from the established Black
leadership, such as the members of the CBC, and to modify the African American political
discourse so that it would not be associated with a one-party approach anymore.  
 
Republican nominations
20 Despite the fact that it had been thus far extremely difficult for African Americans to
integrate  the  Republican  Party,  Reagan’s  election  made  the  new Black  conservatives
confident that it would soon change3. Edwin Meese seemed at least to think so: 
I  think Ronald Reagan is  committed,  as  you suggest  today,  to  putting blacks in
nontraditional roles. There are going to be black people in high places on the White
House staff, but they are not going to be there simply as ambassadors to other black
people. They are going to be there because they have a substantive role to fulfil,
and  black  people  coming  to  the  White  House  will  go  to  the  same  people  that
everyone else does. You are not going to have one person that all blacks have to
funnel through (FP 1981, 161).
21 In fact,  some of the Conference participants played a role in the new administration:
Clarence Thomas was offered the position of under-secretary of education for civil rights
and after a year, was named at the head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
He chaired the commission during eight years; Clarence Pendleton became the chairman
of the United States Civil Rights Commission; Gloria Toote was appointed at the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and became influent in urban affairs; Henry Lucas became
the first African American to serve in the executive committee of the RNC; as for Thomas
Sowell,  he  was  offered a  position in  the  Department  of  housing  and  urban  development
(RUETER 1995, 98).
22 A first step was accordingly made by the new administration in the direction of the new
Black conservatives. Reagan was exploring alternatives to the liberal Black political elite.
 
Black conservatism in the 1980s: will the future be conservative … for Africa...
Revue de recherche en civilisation américaine, 1 | 2009
6
A Conservative Labyrinth
23 As Mack Jones and John Saloma demonstrate in their respective studies, the resurgence of
African American conservatism in the 1980s was orchestrated by a myriad of conservative
think tanks, institutes and other organisations. The success of the event sponsored by the
ICS  led  the  Hoover  Institution  to  create,  for  Sowell  and  some  300  other  Black
conservatives,  a favourable environment for the establishment of  a new conservative
organization at the national level, which could compete with organizations for political
influence such as the NAACP and the Urban League (Saloma 1984, 132). Although it did not
seem to have worked out, after Fairmont, the participants created the New Coalition for
Social  &  Economic  Change,  which  organized,  in  September  1982,  a  conference  entitled
"Rethinking the Black political  program’ (Rueter 1995,  97).  This new coalition was to
become a permanent forum for new approaches to problems of "black poverty, education,
and government dependency. In its statement of purpose, the New Coalition emphasized
the need for approaches “that reject the notion that American blacks need to be cared
for" (New Coalition 1982, 2). 
 
Reagan and the new Black political alliance
24 The positions of the Reagan administration concerning the extension of the federal Civil
Rights Law and the creation of a Martin Luther King holiday worried Black leaders and a
majority  of  African  Americans.  However,  Black  conservatives  such  as  Pendleton
considered that the hostility that African Americans manifested towards the Republican
administration was only caused by the attitude of Black leaders themselves, who had
managed to isolate the Black vote:
The black leaders have made an industry out of racial politics... They created an
industry and sold their only product F02Drace F02Dprimarily to the government and to the
liberal white establishment who are riddled with fear and guilt. These leaders make
and made lots of money, have gained social  acceptance and attract broad-based
media attention. Still there is no parity but there is still poverty (in Brownfeld 1985,
35).
25 Five days before Reagan’s re-election, a meeting between the President and more than a
dozen Black conservatives,  who were all  members  of  the Council  for  a  Black  Economic
Agenda, was organized. This emergent group was led by Robert Woodson, president of the
National  Center  for  Neighborhood  Enterprise,  which  aimed  at  developing  economic
opportunities for Black Americans at the local level.  This meeting, initiated by James
Cicconi, White House staff secretary, may be understood as evidence that Reagan and
Black conservatives were trying to reach common ground:
 [F]or the immediate future, we must avoid the ‘established’ black leadership. Such
leaders are unremittingly hostile to this president and cannot be expected to take a
constructive  approach  The  current  black  leadership  seems,  quite  frankly,  more
interested  in  personal  publicity  and  enhancing  their  influence  within  the
Democratic  party than they are in new approaches to  black problems [...]  Thus
meetings  would  not  only  be  unproductive,  but  would  serve  to  strengthen  the
position of such hostile leaders within their own organizations, and among blacks
generally.  Instead  of  allowing  ourselves  to  be  pressured  into  such  old,  no-win
patterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is a chance of reaching
common ground (in Barnes 1985, 9).
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26 One can draw an easy parallel between the New Coalition and Woodson’s National Center ,
which is considered by Mack Jones as the active branch of the black conservative
movement (Jones 1987, 28). Woodson, member of the American Enterprise Institute, shared
Sowell’s vision: he refused to believe that racial discrimination was the source of all the
social evils that the black community had to endure.
 
Legitimacy
27 With the help of White conservatives, the Fairmont participants tried to elaborate new
economic and political strategies and they benefited from a changing political context.
However,  despite  the  access,  for  some of  them,  to  important  positions  in  the  party
hierarchy,  the new Black conservatives did not manage to be an integral part of the
conservative movement in the beginning of the 80s, and the Republicans’ efforts quickly
became insufficient: the Party did not seem able to offer them a real political influence, as
they remained mainly symbolic. Black conservatives were also unable at the time to find
legitimacy in their ethnic community. Unable to cross party lines, unable as well to find
common ground with the new Black leadership of  the 80s,  the Black conservatives’s
strength  also  happens  to  be  their  weakness:  they  build  their  political  discourse  on
ideological antagonism. The persistence of ethnic links shows that it is still difficult for
African  Americans  to  orient  themselves  toward  greater  political  heterogeneity,  even
though Black interests have become diversified. We know that African Americans still lag
behind economically compared to Whites, as their median income is still inferior to that
of Whites (Jaynes & Williams 1989, 24 and Chapter 6). 
28 However, since the 60s, undeniable progress has been made, and the social gap between
Blacks and Whites is not as wide as it used to be. On the other hand, with the emergence
of a new African American middle class, and the rising number of urban ghetto residents,
there is a widening gap between the members of the ethnic community. As they have
become  more  socially  diverse,  it  is  undeniable  that  their  new  social  divisions  have
modified the way they apprehend social redistribution policies.
29 The 90s, because of ever-increasing social and economic heterogeneity, have shown that
there was a growing disharmony between African Americans and the Black leadership,
which remains mainly liberal (Barker, Jones & Tate 1999). A slow transformation of the
ideological identification of African Americans occurred; it is directly related to the fact
that the Black leadership went through a deep identity crisis which partly undermined its
legitimacy. With the rise and fall of such leaders as Jesse Jackson and Louis Farrakhan, it
showed that it was either unable or unwilling to gather support outside the community.
As this legitimacy was not transposed to Black conservatives, African Americans are still
looking for leaders able to represent their diverse interests. Will they turn towards new
forms of radicalism and nationalism or will they become better politically integrated?
Hopes are high, especially today, that they will find a leader able to promote their specific
interests while at the same time consensual enough to appeal to a greater part of the
American public.
30 As conservative administrations seem unable to address their needs, it is highly unlikely
that African Americans will massively turn to conservative policies and start voting for
the Republican Party in great numbers. If African Americans are becoming much more
conservative today that they were in the 70s, they still articulate their interests within
the Democratic Party. Black conservatives, even though they have influenced the public
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discourse, do not seem to have strong ties with other conservatives, and haven’t started a
movement of their own with real mass support. Nevertheless, as they moved a little bit to
the  right  of  the  political  spectrum,  getting  closer  to  the  center  on  a  lot  of  issues,
indicating that they were receptive to a alternative approach on specific social issues, the
African Americans who haven’t lost their faith in the political process are calling for a
new kind of leadership, which would still  be strongly associated with the Democratic
Party but not as liberal-oriented as before, and with a conservative approach on some
issues; a leader(ship) more representative of the real political heterogeneity of African-
Americans.
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NOTES
1. Since the beginning of the 1960s, social and economic inequality between Blacks and Whites
has been increasing. The victims of poverty were the working poor and the growing number of
Black men without any earning. One also has to take into account the feminization of poverty
and shift to childhood poverty. Public assistance used to play a key role in the support of low-
income families. However, family assistance only benefited single-parent ones. Before the 1970s,
this support extended greatly, but by the early 70s, as it was not indexed to inflation, and because
of new governmental policies, its real value had fallen by at least 30% (see Jaynes & Williams
1989, Chapter 6, 269-328). 
2. Eight years later, they probably thought they had just been proven wrong when they watched
the  Horton  ad  of  George  H.W.  Bush’s  presidential  campaign.  This  ad  featured  an  African
American named Willie Horton; he was a convicted felon who had been released for a weekend,
as the subject of a Massachusetts furlough program, while serving a life sentence. During the
weekend, he committed armed robbery and rape. This ad was of course critical of Democratic
contender Michael Dukakis, who had supported the program.
3. They did not seem to mind the stigmatization of poor African American women collecting
welfare checks – hence the ‘Welfare Queen’ label – in Reagan’s 1976 presidential campaign.
ABSTRACTS
Le  positionnement  politique  des  Afro-Américains  est  semble-t-il  sans  surprise.  Être  afro-
américain,  aujourd’hui,  équivaut  à  revendiquer  des  opinions  politiques  libérales  et  soit  se
désintéresser  du  vote,  soit  voter  pour  le  candidat  du  Parti  démocrate.  L’identification  à
l’idéologie  libérale  et  au  Parti  démocrate  est  si  forte  que  la  communauté  ethnique  est
communauté politique. L’élite politique afro-américaine moderne, d’orientation intégrationniste
libérale, est désireuse de préserver une unité forte. Or, on assiste depuis le début des années 80 à
l’émergence d’un autre courant idéologique au sein de cette communauté : le conservatisme noir.
Pendant l’hiver 1980, le climat politique est tout particulièrement défavorable à la promotion de
tout programme politique libéral-progressiste. La « révolution conservatrice » est en marche, et
pour  la  première  fois,  des  hommes  politiques,  des  économistes,  des  intellectuels  et  des
entrepreneurs, pour la plupart afro-américains et « reaganiens », se réunissent pour proposer un
projet politique commun. La conférence de Fairmont (San Francisco), qui s’est tenue les 12 et 13
décembre 1980,  est  diamétralement  opposée aux conventions  politiques  afro-américaines  qui
l’ont précédée. L’organisme parrainant la conférence, l’Institut des Etudes Contemporaines (ICS),
basé alors à San Francisco, propose des publications d’orientation conservatrice. Les fondateurs
de cette cellule de réflexion conservatrice sont d’anciens conseillers de Reagan lorsque ce dernier
était  gouverneur de Californie.  Le plus éminent d’entre eux,  Edwin Meese III,  est  proche des
conservateurs noirs Thomas Sowell et Clarence Thomas et se prépare à devenir ministre de la
justice sous Reagan ; il est donc présent à la conférence en tant que représentant de la future
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administration  reaganienne.  Cette  conférence  marque-t-elle  les  prémices  d’un  mouvement
conservateur noir à part entière ?
INDEX
Keywords: United States, African-Americans, 1980s, political participation, political parties,
democratic party, republican party, political ideologies, liberal integrationism, black nationalism,
black conservatism
Mots-clés: États-Unis. afro-américains, années 80, participation politique, partis politiques,
parti démocrate, parti républicain, idéologies politiques, intégrationnisme libéral, nationalisme
noir, conservatisme noir
AUTHOR
LISA VERONI-PACCHER
Lisa Veroni-Paccher est maître de conférences en civilisation américaine à l’Université de
Bordeaux III, et rattachée au centre de recherche CLIMAS. Après s’être intéressée de manière
générale aux champs des idéologies et de la participation politique des Afro-Américains, elle
travaille aujourd’hui plus particulièrement sur les rapports qu’entretient le sénateur et candidat
démocrate Barack Obama avec ses électeurs afro-américains potentiels.
Black conservatism in the 1980s: will the future be conservative … for Africa...
Revue de recherche en civilisation américaine, 1 | 2009
11
